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THE RECOVERY OF MONEY - RECOGNISING THE
POTENTIAL OF THE CLAIM FOR MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED
S R SCOTT*
I AN OVERVIEW
I steal a $100.00 bank note from you. Few, if any, would disagree that
the circumstances surrounding my acquisition of this money are such that,
irrespective of whether I still retain that bank note, relief should be avail-
able to you; I should be ordered to pay you the value of the money so
stolen. Few, if any, also would disagree that if I am insolvent, your right
of recovery should remain but should you receive preferential treatment
in the recovery of this money?
Views do differ in respect to the availability of preferential recovery in
the context of an insolvency. But, to take a persuasive example in favour
of preferential recovery, if the bank note remains in my possession and
you can identify it (for instance through its serial number), why shouldn't
you recover that note (or its value) in priority to other claimants against
my insolvent estate; are you not still the owner of that note? In this situa-
tion preferential recovery - at least to the extent that my possession of
your money has not encouraged others to act to their detriment - does
seem warranted.
The focus of this article is the so-called action or claim for money had
and received - one of the common law "personal" remedies for the recov-
ery of money. Irrespective of the merits of the arguments in the above
example for preferential treatment, it is commonly assumed that "money
had and received", resulting as it does in a personal remedy, is unable to
confer preferential recovery in the context of an insolvency - the "per-
sonal" nature of the remedy being contrasted with the so-called
"proprietary" remedies.! This assumption, however, is incorrect; the claim
for money had and received is in fact able to provide, "a result [which
is] akin to priority". 2
The aim of this article is to reveal the potential of money had and
received to provide such preferential recovery. For those who are scepti-
cal of the potential so claimed for this "personal" legal remedy, Part II
* Lecturer in Law, University of Otago. I am grateful to Professor R J Sutton for his com-
ments in respect to an earlier draft of this article.
1 Remedies, usually equitable, which result in the recovery of property of which the plain-
tiff is regarded as the owner.
2 Khurshid and Matthews, "Tracing Confusion" (1979) 95 LQR 78 at 78. Or as the learned
authors of Goff and Jones, The Law ofRestitution, Jones Ed (4th ed 1993) (hereafter
"Goff and Jones") 78 note 34 describe it - a remedy which "may not be less effective
than equity's lien . . .".
240 Otago Law Review (1994) Vol 8 No 2
contains an examination of the history of this claim, the characteristics
which provide it with the ability to confer preferential recovery and a num-
ber of the cases in which preferential treatment has been conferred.
As is displayed in respect to equitable proprietary remedies, preferen-
tial recovery is often associated with the ability to trace one's property
- either to subsequent recipients and/or in to new forms. A similar
association, between tracing and preferential recovery, applies in respect
to money had and received. When compared to the present equitable trac-
ing rules, however, the common law rules appear to be constrained by
"quaint and artificial restrictions". 3 In Part II the common law restric-
tions are examined and a case is made for their liberalisation.
II THE CLAIM FOR MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED
1 An overview of its historical development
The claim for money had and received is a "curious surviv[al] of past
legal history". 4 The following examination of the claim's development is
important for revealing its potential; a potential which is to some extent
"hidden" by layers of misconceptions which it has attracted over the last
few centuries. The immediate origin of the claim (and the origin to which
it owes most of its present form and misconceptions) is as one of the com-
mon pleadings or so-called common counts, derived from the writ of In-
debitatus Assumpsit. Pursuant to this common count, the plaintiff alleged,
in effect, that the defendant was indebted to him or her for a certain sum
of money which the defendant had received to the plaintiff's use and that
contrary to the defendant's promise to pay this sum, he or she had not
so repaid it. 5
The form of this pleading does suggest that the claim was directed to
the recovery of a consensually created debt and as such there would appear
to be good grounds for being sceptical of the assertions as to its potential
to confer preferential recovery which were made earlier. The history of
the development of Indebitatus Assumpsit and its progeny, however, is
a history of the use of fictions - particularly fictitious promises and fic-
titious debts. It is submitted that these fictions have been a significant
factor in both camouflaging the true nature of money had and received
and providing a foundation for the assumption that common law claims
for the recovery of money (i.e. currency as distinct from the recovery of
specific notes and coins) always take the form of the recovery of a debt. 6
3 Nimmo v Westpac Banking Corporation [1993] 3 NZLR 21~ (He) at 23~ per Blanchard J.
4 In re Cleadon Trust [1939] Ch 286 (CA) at 314 per Scott LJ.
5 See Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law ofRestitution (paperback, ed 1989) (here-
after "Birks") 79 for a condensed version of the pleading, and Stephen on Pleading (3rd
ed 1827) 312 for a fuller version.
6 This assumption has been noted by Professor S F C Milsom, Historical Foundations
of the Common Law (2nd ed 1981) (hereafter "Milsom, Historical Foundations') 278,
and Professor R M Goode, "The Right to Trace and its Impact in Commercial Trans-
actions" (1976) 92 LQR 360 and 528 at 361.
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Although its form may be derived from the writ of Indebitatus Assump-
sit, the researches of legal historians have shown that money had and
received can trace its origins to a period earlier than that associated with
the rise of the writ of Assumpsit, back to the writ of Account;7 a writ
which appears to have been premised on a different view of "legal" in-
terests in money than we are accustomed to. Reflecting these older origins,
the essence of the claim is that the defendant has received money and while
he or she may have acquired some rights in respect to that money, the
circumstances surrounding its payment and/or receipt are such that the
law imposes an obligation upon him or her to pay an equivalent sum of
money to the plaintiff.
a) The Writ of Account
What is significant about this writ and its important legacy for the claim
for money had and received is the evidence which it provides that the com-
mon law has recognised that a monetary relationship between two parties
does not have to be either one of bailor-bailee or creditor-debtor, but can
be of an intermediary nature. Indeed, Professor Milsom suggests that "[t]he
hypothesis behind [this writ] was that one could have something like a
property right in money in another's hands". 8
Developed originally to regulate the relationship of the manorial bailiff
with his lord, the writ of Account was, as Professor Milsom has observed,
"of great practical importance in the middle ages". 9 In essence, the writ
set in motion a procedure by which the bailiff was required to supply to
independent auditors details of the money which he had received and the
payments which he had made on behalf of his lord's landed interests. In
the 13th century a process began by which the writ of Account became
available in other situations in which there was a pre-existing relationship
between the parties, for instance as against "all manner of receivers" .10
This process of extension in availability continued into the 14th century
when, as Professor Stoljar's researches have revealed, the writ became
available in situations in which the defendant "was technically a stranger
7 Indeed Professor Ames has suggested that "the action of account is [the] father of the
count for money had and received". J B Ames, Lectures in Legal History (reprint edi-
tion 1986) (hereafter "Ames, Lectures') 12l.
8 Milsom, Historical Foundations, supra n6 at 275.
9 Idem.
10 Legal historians are divided both as to the significance of the extension to receivers and
the distinction between "bailiffs" and "receivers". Although Professor Milsom suggests
that the receiver's origins may have been independent from that of the bailiff (and if
so they were probably mercantile), he acknowledges that "receiver" may have originally
referred to "the mere collector of money rents, ecclesiastical dues and so on". Ibid at
280. Support for this latter interpretation is provided by Professor Langdell, "A Brief
Survey of Equity Jurisdiction" (1889) 2 Harv LR 241 at 244.
Irrespective of the origins of the "receiver", the researches of Professor Stoljar suggests
that it came to encompass mercantile transactions, "in which (for example) a plaintiff
(P) g[ave to] the defendant (D) goods to sell but D later omit[ed] to hand over the profits
or proceeds to P, or P g[ave] money to D to buy goods for P which D then neglect[ed]
to do ...". S J Stoljar, "The Transformations of Account" (1964) 80 LQR 203 at 206.
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to [the plaintiff]"ll - for instance where he or she had received money
from a third party which he or she was to transfer to the plaintiff. 12 In
essence, it became the circumstances surrounding the payment and not
the parties relationship which created the obligation to account and the
plaintiff's legal interest in the money so received by the defendant. Freed
from the need to establish a direct relationship between the parties, the
writ of Account was poised to become available in many new situations.
As Professor Stoljar observed:
"Thus there was little difficulty in applying account where money was paid by mis-
take, as where money intended for C was paid to D, or P had mistakenly paid D
a larger sum than D was entitled to. Nor was there difficulty in extending account
to what was virtually a constructive trust, as where D acting as agent was guilty of
some sharp practice13 or dishonesty. "14
So what happened whereby the common law's recognition of the
"accounting" relationship and extended ideas of ownership associated with
the writ of Account became forgotten by the practitioner of the common
law? In essence it is submitted that this is a product of the assimilation
of this writ, first by the writ of Debt and then by the writ of Assumpsit.
b) The decline in the recognition of the accounting relationship
(i) Absorption by the writ of Debt
While the writ of Account commenced a procedure whereby the state
of the parties accounts were determined, it did not order the payment of
11 Stoljar, "The Transformations of Account" ibid at 208. The extension in the availability
of the writ of Account to "receivers" appears to have been the catalyst for this extension.
12 See Stoljar, "The Transformations of Account" ibid at 209-210. Professor Ames observes
that, "[o]riginally [the action of account] was the only remedy where A delivered money
to B for C. There was no debt because that presupposed a contract between the debtor
and creditor, and in this case C was no party to this transaction." Ames, Lectures, supra
n7 at 118.
13 An example which Professor Stoljar gives in support of the availability of the writ of
Account where there had been "sharp practice" is Harrington v Deane (1613) Hob 36;
1 Br & Gold 26. As noted by Professor Stoljar, in that case P asked D to collect £200
from C that C owed to P. Apparently C had no money and therefore asked D to borrow
the £200 "for him [C) of anybody", and to pay this money over to P. D succeeded in
borrowing the money but then kept it for himself. The decision was that D was account-
able to P, and this because (as the court explained) when D borrowed the money for
C, "it became first [C's] money and by him it was delivered over unto [D] to be paid
unto [P] for his debt (though it never came to [C's] own hand actually), and so it became
(P's] money received by the hands of [C]".
14 Stoljar, "The Transformations of Account", supra nl0 at 210-212. Professor Ames, "The
History of Assumpsit" (1888) 2 Harv LR 1 and 53 at 66, suggests that the idea under-
lying th~ writ of Account was that "[o]ne who received money from another to be applied
in a particular way was bound to give an account of his stewardship". Professor Stoljar,
"The Transformations of Account", supra at 211, however, regarded these extensions
as important for emphasising proprietary ideas or theory which he suggested underlay
this writ. "The theory essentially was that a person became accountable for a sum of
money to which, as regards the particular plaintiff, he himself could maintain no firm
title or proprietary right."
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any balance found due by the defendant. The recovery of any money found
to be due to the plaintiff was facilitated through the writ of Debt. Is
The involvement of the writ of Debt in the recovery process has had
an important consequence for the 20th century lawyer's understanding of
the claim for money had and received. By its very name, the writ of Debt
provides support for the assumption that what was being recovered was
a consensually created debt. I6 The role of this writ in the accounting
process, however, was subsidiary to that of the writ of Account which
determined the rights of the respective parties; the writ of Debt merely
provided the means by which the recovery of the plaintiffs "money" could
be achieved.
As was noted earlier the writ of Account is important for its recogni-
tion that a monetary relationship between two parties does not have to
be either one of bailor-bailee or creditor-debtor, but can be of an inter-
mediary nature. The intermediary nature of this relationship is reinforced
by the fact that although the defendant was "handling [money which] was
in some sense ·not his",17 his or her obligation to restore this money to
its rightful owner was satisfied by restoring the value of that money and
not the particular money so received. As Professor Milsom has observed,
15 Until the late 14th century, when the availability of the writ was restricted to parties in
established relationships - principally the manorial lord against his bailiff - it appears
that if on the completion of this process it was found that the accounts were in favour
of the Lord, the defendant could be committed to the King's nearest prison until he
accounted for the appropriate sum of money. Stoljar, "The Transformations of Account",
supra nl0 at 205.
16 Although in some situations this writ was available for the recovery of a consensually
created obligation to pay, there is evidence to support Professor Baker's conclusion that
medieval lawyers "saw [D]ebt as [being] . . more like property than breach of promise".
See generally J H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (3rd ed 1990) at
365-366. Interestingly, the writ of Debt appears to have been available not only to recover
money but also in some situations fungibles.
As with the writ of Account, some historians suggest that the writ of Debt was one of
the writs of right. But see Goodhart and Hanbury Ed, Holdsworthy, History ofEnglish
Law (7th ed 1956) vol ii at 368 where it is suggested that this writ was "somewhat similar
in form to the writ of right". The significance of De.bt being a writ of right is that through
such writs the plaintiff asserted the restoration of a right as opposed to the complaint
of a wrong done to him. (Writs of right were available, for instance, for the recovery
of land and chattels. See Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 68.) As
Professor Ames has observed, if successful "[t]he judgment was not for damages, but
for the recovery of a debt, regarded as a res". Ames, "The History of Assumpsit", supra
n14 at 55. See also Ames, Lectures, supra n7 at 88.
Further support for the proprietary nature of the writ of Debt is provided by its close
association with the writ of Detinue. Indeed the learned authors of Holdsworth, A His-
tory of English Law, supra (volume iii at 348) consider that they were "twin actions",
observing that "[t]he writ of debt was originally almost one with the writ of detinue.
To the end their wording was almost identical" (Holdsworth, A History ofEnglish Law,
volume ii at 366). One important difference between these writs, however, was that Debt,
unlike Detinue, could survive the excusable loss of the coins. As Professor Baker ob-
served, it is self-evident that a "debt ... unlike coins, cannot be lost or stolen", Baker,
(An Introduction to English Legal History at 441).
17 Milsom, Historical Foundations, supra n6 at 278.
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"[a]lthough the underlying idea [of the writ of Account] was that the
accountant had been handling money 'belonging' to the claimant, there
were of course no actual coins that he owned, so that [the finding that
the plaintiff was required to pay a sum of money] was the only possible
outcome".18 Or as Professor Langdell explained:
"If the property received consists of money, the defendant [accountant] must not be
bound to restore to the plaintiff the identical coin received by him; for, if he is, he
will be a mere bailee, e.g. if the money be sealed up in a bag. [He also must not]
... have a right to appropriate the money received to his own use, for then he can
only be a debtor. But he must receive the money either to keep for the plaintiff, or
to employ for the plaintiff's benefit; and yet his obligation must be capable of being
discharged by returning to the plaintiff (not the identical money received, but) any
money equal in amount to the sum received."19
In essence, a right which was premised on some extended ideas of owner-
ship of money was enforced through an order that the defendant account-
ant pay the value of that money to the plaintiff. 20
In the 16th century the writ of Debt began playing a more important
and direct role in the recovery of money from the defendant "account-
ant". Plaintiffs began successfully persuading the courts that in some sit-
uations it was unnecessary for them to commence both the writ of Account
and the writ of Debt. As Professor Birks has observed, "[a]fter some hesi-
tation the law accepted that, if [the plaintiff] knew what sum was due ...
and did not need to take an account in order to ascertain it, [the plaintiff]
could go straight to the action of debt".21 Thus began a process by which
the writ of Account was absorbed into the writ of Debt; a process which
was to end with the absorption of that writ into the writ of Indebitatus
Assumpsit.
(ii) Absorption by the writ of Assumpsit
Although the availability of the writ of Assumpsit was initially restricted
to those situations in which the writ of Debt was unavailable,22 the 16th
century also saw its triumph over that writ as plaintiffs sought to avail
themselves of the two significant advantages which it offered - the non-
18 Milsom, Historical Foundations, ibid at 276. See also Langdell, "A Brief Survey of Equity
Jurisdiction", supra n10 at 245-6. The obligation to pay an equivalent sum of money,
as opposed to restoring the money so received, is also consistent with the common law's
approach to protecting interests in chattels.
19 Langdell, "A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction", ibid at 245-6.
20 In any event the nature of the resulting debt (i.e. whether it was an obligation to pay
arising out of a consensually created debt, or was imposed to facilitate the restoration
of the value of one's "property") only really becomes important with the rise of the
bankruptcy laws having universal application and, with them, the recognition of the con-
cepts of rateable distribution amongst unsecured creditors and absolution from the re-
maining indebtedness.
21 Birks, supra n5 at 78-80.
22 For instance claims based on wagers and claims against sureties - see generally H K
Lucke, "Slade's Case and the Origins of the Common Counts" (1965) 81 LQR 422 and
539, (1966) 82 LQR 81 at 428 (hereafter, Lucke's "Slade's Case").
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availability of "wager of law" as a means of determining issues of fact
and simplified pleading requirements. 23 It was through the use of plead-
ing devices and fictions (whose object was to conceal the fact that the plain-
tiff was seeking to use Assumpsit in a situation in which the writ of Debt
was available) that Assumpsit became the dominant action. Noted by
Professor Lucke as "the most important and the most elusive of all the[se]
pleading devices",24 Indebitatus Assumpsit was premised on an assump-
tion that the defendant had promised to pay an existing debt; this promise
providing the means by which the writ of Debt could be circumvented.
Originally an actual promise, Slade's Case25 held that it would suffice
if this promise to pay could be implied from the facts constituting the in-
debtedness. Subsequently, this promise became "a pure fiction"26 and with
this development the writ of assumpsit became available for all of those
situations for which the writ of Debt had been available, including those
situations in which the "debt" had arisen from an accounting relationship.
As Professor Birks has observed:
"[t]he effect of Slade's Case should have been limited to allowing assumpsit to be
used instead of [the writ of D]ebt in those cases in which the facts constituting the
indebtedness did include an express or tacit promise to pay ... Nevertheless, during
the 17th century the courts accepted that a plaintiff could use assumpsit to recover
any debt [recoverable by the writ of Debt]. The plaintiffs action would allege the
debt facts and would go on to say that the defendant had promised to pay, but he
would win by proving only the debt facts."27
As was noted above, one of the advantages of Assumpsit over Debt
was the more relaxed pleading requirements. As the focus of the assump-
sit action was on the promise, the plaintiff was only required to plead in
a general way the circumstances which gave rise to the debt. Although
Professor Lucke28 argues that Slade's Case reintroduced to Indebitatus
Assumpsit the requirement that full particulars of the debt had to be
pleaded, the 17th century witnessed the successful experimentation with
amended versions of the former general indebitatus declarations in which
it was simply "assert[ed] that the defendant was indebitatus in the amount
demanded for money lent, for the price of work and materials or of goods
sold and delivered or the like". 29 These experiments culminated in the de-
23 See Lucke, "Slade Case", ibid at 425-6 for a discussion of these advantages. In respect
of the pleading advantage, Professor Milsom observes, "[o]n the old trespassory basis
[underlying assumpsit] . .. the transaction creating the debt was not relevant to the claim
notionally being made. If the action had really been about damage suffered by reliance
on a separate promise to pay, all that would have mattered was that at the beginning
of the story the defendant was indebitatus to the plaintiff; and often that was all that
was alleged. How the debt had arisen would not emerge until evidence was given at the
trial." Historical Foundation, supra n6 at 354-5.
24 Lucke "Slade's Case", supra n22 at 548.
25 (1602) 4 Co Rep 92b; 76 ER 1074.
26 J B Ames, "The History of Assumpsit", supra n14 at -64.
27 Birks, supra n5 at 35.
28 Lucke "Slade's Case", supra n22 at 86-91.
29 Milsom, Historical Foundations, supra n6 at 354-5.
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velopment of the common counts. As one of these common counts, the
action for money had and received provided the shorthand formula for
those situations which had been indirectly inherited from the writ of
Account.
While the development of the action for money had and received may
have simplified the pleading requirements, the reference in the pleadings
to the indebtedness and the promise to repay has had the unfortunate result
of obscuring its inheritance of the accounting relationship and the extended
ideas of ownership in money underlying the writ of Account. As Profes-
sor Langdell observed:
"Undoubtedly, the distinction between a debt and an obligation to account is one
which there is some danger of losing sight of, and this danger has been much in-
creased by the disuse of the action of account. Moreover, this distinction has been
much obscured by the prev~lence of the indebitatus count in assumpsit for money
had and received. That count, indeed, seems to have been framed in entire forgetful-
ness that any such distinction existed, for it alleges a legal impossibility, namely, that
the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for money had and received by the defen-
dant to the plaintiff's use. If, in truth, the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff for
money had and received by the defendant, it follows that the money was received
by the defendant to his own use; and if the money was in truth received by the defen-
dant to the plaintiffs use, it follows that it is the plaintiffs money, and that the defen-
dant is accountable for it. "30 .
Throughout this article reference has been made to money had and
received. While this is just a shorthand reference to the claim and the ideas
underlying it, this reference omits the fundamental characteristic of the
claim, that the money was received by the defendant to the plaintiffs use.
To reflect this fundamental characteristic, the claim should really be
referred to as one for "money had and received to the plaintiffs use".
Nevertheless, the claim is not commonly referred to in this extended short-
hand formula. As Professor Langdell further observed:
"Less mischief [in the inconsistency in the language of the claim] ... has resulted
from it than might have been anticipated; for English lawyers, acting with their usual
practical good sense, have treated the count as alleging an indebtedness for money
had and received, and the words "to the plaintiffs use" have been disregarded. "31
In a similar vein Professor Stoljar lamented:
"Not only was account largely superseded [by the claim for money had and received], but
the principle of accountability was being forgotten too. Because of its ties with assumpsit
money had and received was creating the impression that all its applicable instances were
strictly contractual .... [T]his contractualisation of money had and received not only ob-
scured its historical connection with account, it did much worse, it obscured the whole doc-
trine that account had evolved: the doctrine that money could be recovered quite indepen-
dently of debt or contract, that money was thus recoverable on a theory of trust or account-
ability, that is recoverab~e wherever a defendant was in possession of a sum of money that
.could be said to belong to the plaintiff, to be his rather than the defendant's property."32
30 Langdell, "A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction" supra nl0 at 254-5.
31 Idem.
32 Stoljar, "The Transformations of Account", supra nl0 at 218-9.
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(iii) The expansion of money had and received beyond the l
"accounting" relationship
Despite the impression conveyed in the last paragraphs, the develo -
ment of the claim for money had and received was not all negative. o[e
positive aspect was the continuation in the expansion of the situations in
which the law would impose an obligation upon the recipient of mon y
to repay the value of that money.33 As Professor Ames observt,'
"[a]lthough Assumpsit for money had and received was in its infan y
merely a substitute for Account, it gradually outgrew the limits of t at
action".34 Given the history of Indebitatus Assumpsit it may not be s~r­
prising that this expansion arose through the use of further fictions -
this time it was the turn of the "debt" - Le. the underlying obligati n
to account or repay. As Professor Birks observes: I
"the circumstances which would make a man a constructive receiver to the Plaintifrs
use were multiplied so that, whenever the facts were such that the law held thi a
man ought to give up a payment, he was said, whatever his actual intention, to h ve
received on behalf of the plaintiff. These constructive receivers were not only n-
appointed but also unaware of receiving other than to their own use. . . . [T]he re ult
of this extension [can be seen] in the generalisation achieved in Moses v MaC!ertanj ".15
It will be recalled that in that case Lord Mansfield considered that ~he
law implies the debt so as to facilitate the bringing of the claim for mo~eY
had and received if the defendant was, "under an obligation, from he
ties of natural justice, to refund" the money.36 Examples given by L rd
Mansfield as to circumstances in which such an obligation would ar·se
were:
"money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for money got
through imposition (express or implied); or extortion; or oppression; or an undue adv n-
tage taken of the plaintiffs situation, contrary to the laws made for the protection of er-
sons under those circumstances."37
A significant aspect of this expansion is that the action is becoming aV~il­
able (Le. the "debt" is being implied) so as to provide a remedy in c n-
tractual situations, for instance where there had been a total failureIof
consideration; a situation which is quite different from the ear ier
"accounting" situations.
33 An expansion which has continued in the 20th century, two recent examples being the
use of the claim for money had and received to recover money paid pursuant to an u tra
vires tax regulation - Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue c~m­
missioners (No 2) [1992] 3 WLR 366 (HL), and the recovery of money paid purs ant
to a causative as opposed to a fundamental mistake - Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Si ms
Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] 1 QB 677. See also the judgment of Hobhou e J
and Dillion LJ in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC (1993j 91
LGR 323 and [1994] 1 WLR 938 (CA) respectively, in respect to the development of the
idea of recovery for absence of consideration as opposed to a total failure of considerafon.
34 J B Ames, "The History of Assumpsit", supra n14 at 67-68.
35 Birks, supra n5 at 78-80.
36 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005; 97 ER 678 at 1008, 678.
37 Idem.
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(iv) The implied contract theory
Confronted with both an expansion in the situations in which money
had and received was becoming available and a fear that Lord Mansfield
was introducing to English law, that "vague jurisprudence which is some-
times attractively styled 'justice as between man and man' ",38 the com-
mon law sought a rationale which would provide a theoretical founda-
tion for the claim. In hindsight, given the claim's immediate origins, the
attractiveness of "requests" for justifying the imposition of liability39 and
the fact that the aim was to justify the imposition of liability upon the
immediate recipient of the money (as opposed to subsequent recipients),
it is not surprising that the "implied contract theory" was advanced dur-
ing the 19th and early 20th centuries as the rationale. It will be recalled
that pursuant to this theory it was considered that the claim "was in prin-
ciple one which rested on a promise to pay, either actual or imputed by
law".40 Attributed with such an underlying rationale it is not surprising
that money had and received became regarded as a remedy for the recov-
ery of money as if it were a consensually created debt. 41 At the close of
the 20th century, there is of course increasing acceptance that the under-
lying "rationale" for this claim is that of remedying unjust enrichment, 42
but how many of the "assumptions" associated with the implied contract
theory remain?
c) Misconceptions
One hundred and fifty years ago Messrs Bullen and Leake described
the action for money had and received as "the most comprehensive of all
the common counts . . . [being] applicable wherever the defendant has
received money which in justice and equity belongs to the plaintiff, under
circumstances which render the receipt of it a receipt by the defendant
to the use of the plaintiff'. 43 Like all generalisations, this description cap-
tures some of the essence of the claim, for instance that the circumstances
surrounding the receipt and/or retention of the money is an important
aspect of the claim. Like all generalisations, however, this description is
also in some respects misleading; the reference to the "rationale" of "justice
and equity" borrowed from Lord Mansfield hides the fact that, reflecting
its various stages of extension in availability, the claim is available in quite
different situations.
The same misconception, which is present in the implied contract theory,
also can occur with the "unjust enrichment" rationale. As the learned
authors of Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution remind us, "unjust
38 Baylis v Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch 127 (CA) at 140 per Hamilton LJ.
39 Associated with the rise of the laissez-faire philosophy and contractual liability. See gener-
ally A S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979).
40 Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 at 415 per Viscount Haldane LC; at 432-3 per Lord
Dunedin; and at 452 per Lord Summer. A view recently confirmed by Lord Templemann
in Guiness Pic v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663.
41 Sinclair v Brougham, ibid at 414 per Viscount Haldane LC and at 433 per Lord Dunedin.
42 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 10 (HL), at 16,32; Martin v Pont [1993]
3 NZLR 25 (CA) at 30.
43 Bullen and Leake's Precedents of Pleading (3rd ed 1865) at 44.
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enrichment" is simply the name which is commonly given to the\princiPle
of justice which the law recognises and gives effect to in s.ituation in which
a defendant finds himself or herself in possession of a benefit which, in
justice, he or she should restore to the plaintiff. 44 A recipient rf money
can become unjustly enriched by the receipt of money in a varie y of situ-
ations; some arise in the context of a contractual relationship - as where
there has been a total failure of consideration;45 others arise ou side such
a relationship - for instance some mistaken payments46 and ayments
made pursuant to an ultra vires statutory regulation. 47 Another way in
which a recipient of money can become unjustly enriched is w en he or
she receives money which "belongs" to another. 48
A danger with the application of generalised rationales to e plain the
availability of the claim for money had and received is the afumption
which they encourage that the claim displays the same char cteristics
whenever it is available. While the claim does display some common
characteristics throughout its use - principally a focus upon t e receipt
of the money and not the retention of that money, 49 the specif c motiva-
tion for its availability in any given situation differs depending n the cir-
CUlnstances in which the money is received. In some situatio s, for in-
stance the recovery of payments made under coercion, the court in grant-
ing relief through this action can be seen as responding to th fact of a
non-voluntary transfer; in the context of a total failure of con ideration
the response may be regarded as being to a fundamental bre kdown in
the contract. In respect to other situations, however, for instance the recov-
ery of stolen money, the law can be seen as responding to the 10 s of one's
money, the law protecting the plaintiffs "ownership" of his or er money.
It is in the context of protecting one's ownership of money tha the claim
for money had and received has the potential to confer prefere~tial recov-
ery in the context of an insolvency. Take an example where the plaintiff's
ownership is recognised - the recovery of stolen money. The th ef of your
$100.00 bank note (serial number AC094856) does not become the owner
of it; it is still your bank note and you can assert your owner~iP rights
to that bank note against him or her. Your ownership of that ank note
may also survive its physical transfer to another50 and in situatio s in which
it does survive, you can assert your ownership against that r~iPient. In
protecting one's ownership of money, the claim for money had a d received
becomes available, therefore, against all the recipients ofthat oney until
44 Supra n2 at 12. t
45 Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500.
46 Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Simms, Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd, supra 33.
47 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No ~, supra n33.
48 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, supra n42. r
49 See generally Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1992] 4 All ER 451 (CA) at 4 3-4 per Fox
LJ. See also Martin v Pont, supra n42.
50 While a bank note is a specific piece of property capable of ownership, it is also cur-
rency. As such it constitutes an exception to the nemo dat rule; ownershi
f
will pass to
a recipient who receives it "fairly and honestly upon a valuable and bona fi e considera-
tion". Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452; 97 ER 398 at 457-8; 401 per Lor Mansfield.
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such time as ownership transfers to another. In essence, the plaintiff owner
of the money has a choice of defendant(s).51
A classic example of this ability to sue subsequent recipients of one's
money is provided by Clarke v Shee and Johnston. 52 In that case the plain-
tiffs clerk had received money for which he was liable to account to the
plaintiff. Instead of so accounting, however, the clerk used some of the
money to purchase lottery tickets from the defendants. 53 As Lord Mans-
field observed, "the money and notes which [the clerk] paid to the defen-
dants [were] the identical notes and money of the plaintiff'.54 Having iden-
tified his money as having been received by the defendant, the plaintiff
was able to successfully bring an action for money had and received against
them.
It is a combination of the ability to bring this claim against all recipients
of one's money and the fact that liability arises from the receipt and not
the retention of that money, which provides the means by which the com-
mon law can confer preferential recovery in the context of an insolvency.
Indeed, in some respects, this claim, with its focus on the receipt of money,
may be able to confer a more effective remedy than some equitable
proprietary remedies. While a change of position defence may be avail-
able to the innocent recipient of another's money,55 his or her potential
liability must be contrasted with that of the innocent recipient of trust
money who may only be liable to repay the value of the money remain-
ing, the onus being on the plaintiff to show continued retention of that
money (or its product).56
2 Examples of preferential recovery
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Lt(}57 provides modern judicial support, at
the highest level, for the use of the claim for money had and received
against subsequent recipients of one's money, so as to avoid the conse-
quences of the immediate recipient's insolvency. This case involved a claim
by the plaintiff firm of solicitors to recover money which had been mis-
appropriated from its client account by one of its partners (one Cass) and
unsuccessfully gambled by him at the defendant club. By being able to
51 As Professor Goode in "The Right to Trace and its Impact in Commercial Transactions",
supra n6 at 369-370, has explained: "Each movement of the asset from one recipient
to another ... brings into existence a distinct personal right of [the owner]; and since
the recipient, having once incurred a personal duty by his receipt of the asset, cannot
thereafter shuffle it off by a dealing inconsistent with [the owner's] rights but on the
contrary will infringe such rights by that dealing, it follows that [the owner's] ... rights
against the successive recipients are not alternative but cumulative."
52 (1774) 1 Cowp 197; 98 ER 1041.
53 While the defendant gave "value" for this money by issuing the lottery tickets, this value
did not constitute good consideration; the transaction being contrary to the Lottery Act
1772.
54 Clarke v Shee and Johnston, supra n52 at 200; 1043.
55 A common law change of position defence was recognised by the House of Lords in
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, supra n42. See also s 94B Judicature Act 1908 for a
statutory change of position defence.
56 See generally M Cope, Constructive Trusts (1992) at 385-387.
57 Supra n42. See also Banque Beige Pour L'Etrangerv Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321 (CA).
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trace "their" money from the bank's chose in action, thro gh the hands
of Cass, to the defendant club, the plaintiffs were able to tr nsform what
was a worthless personal remedy against the now insolve t Cass into a
valuable personal remedy against the solvent defendant c'lub.
What if the immediate recipient has retained the money and becomes
insolvent? In this situation it may be possible to regar l the Official
Assignee (or equivalent) as the subsequent recipient. As M ssrs Khurshid
and Matthews have observed:
"If A's property is in B's hands and B goes bankrupt, title does not ass to B's trustee
in bankruptcy. If the trustee nevertheless gets hold of it he can b sued personally
... so that he must either return the chattel or pay full damages. hus a result akin
to priority in bankruptcy is achieved by using common law actirs."58
Judicial support for use of money had and received agai!st the Official
Assignee is provided by Scott v Surman. 59 As Mr Michael Scott has ob-
served, the plaintiffs in that case "were able to recover t e money ...
in full as against the general credits of [the insolvent], whi h is the object
of a claim in rem in equity. They obtained this object ... b a direct claim
against the assignees in their personal capacity, because in heir represen-
tative capacity they had no right to keep the money".60 In t at case, Jona-
than Scott and Francis Richardson consigned a quantity f tar to their
agent - Richard Scott (Jonathan's brother). Richard sold he tar, receiv-
ing in return two promissory notes and the discharge of h s own debt to
the purchaser. Richard then became bankrupt and the defendant assig-
nees received both the money due on the promissory notes and a bounty
paid by the government for the tar's importation. The plaintiffs success~
fully brought a claim for money had and received against Ithe defendant
assignees in respect of the money derived from the promis$ory notes and
the bounty which they had received.61 As Willes CJ obserlved in deliver-
ing the judgment of the Court: I
58 Khurshid and Matthews, "Tracing Confusion", supra n2 at 78. To Jsimilar effect Mr
Pearce, "A Tracing Paper" (1976) 40 Conv 277 at 284, observed: "It isl true that the com-
mon law remedy is only personal, an obligation to pay damages, but this limitation has
not resulted in any reluctance to follow property. The right remain proprietary. The
... In any case, an order to pay damages is a remedy little less effica ious than equity's
declaration of charge. This is so even on bankruptcy, for the remedy f damages is avail-
able against the trustele in bankruptcy personally, and so is not sub'ect to abatement,
if by tracing it can be shown that he wrongly took property which belonged, at law,
to the claimant."
59 (1742) Willes 400; 125 ER 1235. See also Whitecomb v Jacob (1711) 1S~k 160' 91 ER 149.
60 Michael Scott, "The Right to Trace at Common Law" [1965-66] WA R 463 at 482. For
a contrary view see Mr Cuthbertson, "Tracing at Common Law - yth or Reality?"
(1968) 8 UWALR 204, who suggests that a plaintiff should only be abl to sue the Official
Assignee (or equivalent) in his representative capacity as otherwise t is would prejudice
the other creditors. t
61 Because this money could be identified as directly attributable to th promissory notes.
and the bounty, which in turn were directly attributable to the impo tation and sale of
the tar, the plaintiffs c:ould substitute their proprietary interest in th tar for the money
received by the defendants.
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"The general rule is that if a man receives money which ought to be paid to another
or to apply to a particular purpose to which he does not apply it, this action will
lie as for money had and received.... To apply this general rule to the present case.
The assignees having received this money which belongs to the plaintiffs and ought
not to be applied to pay the bankrupt's debts, and they ought to have paid it to the
plaintiffs, and not having done so, this action will lie against them for so much money
had and received to the use of the plaintiffs."62
If personal recovery against the Official Assignee (or equivalent) could
only be achieved by showing that he or she had received the plaintiffs
money, such recovery would be rare. Because we usually value a bank
note or coin for the "purchasing power in terms of commodities"63 which
it represents,64 one's possession of money is usually short lived; within
a short time of its receipt, a bank note or coin will be either exchanged
for goods or services or deposited in a bank and thereby exchanged into
a chose in action. In responding to this factor the common law, as dis-
played in Scott v Surman, has employed tracing rules to show that a
proprietary interest originally in one asset (Le. a bank note) now resides
in another asset. Assume for example that I steal your money and use
it to buy a car. While you may no longer have legal title to the money
- it may now legally belong to the car vendor - nevertheless, you may
be able to claim "ownership" of the car. If you can, the claims of conver-
sion and detinue are potentially available to you to protect and recover
that interest against me or any other person (for instance the Official
Assignee) who asserts an interest in the car contrary to your interest.
Taylor v Plumer65 provides the classic exposition of the common law's
approach to tracing into a substitute asset. In that case, the defendant
authorised his stockbroker (one Walsh) to uplift funds from his bank and
invest those funds in the purchase of Exchequer Bills. Contrary to these
instructions and with the aim of facilitating his flight from the country,
Welsh used some of these funds to acquire some American shares and
stock. He also exchanged part of these funds for notes of smaller denomi-
nation and using some of these replacement notes, purchased a quantity
of bullion. Before Walsh could leave the country, however, he was located
by the defendant's attorney and surrendered to him the shares, stock and
bullion. The plaintiffs, as Walsh's assignees in bankruptcy, then unsuc-
cessfully commenced proceedings in trover against the defendant in respect
of these shares, stock and bullion. The court held that as the defendant
could trace his money into these chattels, he had a better right to them
than the plaintiffs. As Lord Ellenborough CJ observed:
62 Scott v Surman, supra n59 at 403-405; 1237-8 per Willes CJ.
63 Banco de Portugal v Waterlow & Sons [1932] AC 452 at 508 per Lord Macmillan.
64 Although money "appears in the function of a mere instrument for measuring the value
of individual parts of wealth ... [it] also appears in a second and higher function, viz.
it embraces the value itself which is measured by it". Savigny, Obligationenrecht i at
405 cited by Dr F A Mann, The Legal Aspects of Money (5th ed 1992) 28.
65 (1815) 3 M & S 562; 105 ER 721.
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"It makes no difference in reason or law into what other for ,different from the
original, the change may have been made, whether it be into tha of promissory notes
for the security of the money which was produced by the sale of the goods of the
principal, ... or into other merchandize, ... for the produc of or substitute for
the original thing still follows the nature of the thing itself, so I ng as it can be ascer-
tained to be such, and the right only ceases when the means f ascertainment fail
"66
As shown by these examples, the claim for money had nd received does
have the potential to confer preferential recovery in an nsolvency situa-
tion. This potential is dependent, however, upon the abilit to both initially
assert "ownership" in the money and trace that money into a substitute
product and/or to a subsequent recipient, who has not obtained owner-
ship of that money (or in the case of a substitute prod~ct, ownersh,ip of
that product). So, to adopt the words of Lord Ellenborpugh, when does
the means of ascertainment fail? The traditional answet, unfortunately,
has been quite often. In comparison to the "modern" quitable tracing
rules and presumptions, the common law has continu~d a conservative
approach. I
III TRACING AT COMMON LAW
The conservative approach of the common law is dilsplayed by three
important limitations which it has imposed on itself, or }¥hich it has been
suggested the common. law should impose upon itself.flthough one of
these limitations no longer aP.Plies, their combined effe t has been to en-
courage a belief that the ability of the claim for money ad and received
to confer preferential recovery is very limited.
1 The limitations
a) Admixture of money I
As Lord Greene MR observed in Re Diplock, t~e common law
approaches tracing "in a strictly materialistic way". 67 ~pplying what has
been referred to as an "exchange-product" theory of t~acing,68 the com-
mon law has adopted the requirement that there has to be evidence of
a direct substitution of one asset for another; only in Isuch cases would
it regard the new asset as belonging to the plaintiff. ,In, the'~".context of tracing
money, this prerequisite means that the right to trace is I st once the plain-
tiff's money is mixed with any other money or mixed i the purchase of
another asset. As was noted by Lord Ellenborough in Taylor v Plumer:
I
66 Ibid at 575; 726.
67 [1948] 1 Ch 465 at 518. 1
68 As Messrs Khurshid and Matthews, "Tracing Confusion", supra 2 at 79 observe, pur-
suant to this theory, "where A owns property which B without au hority exchanges for
cash ~r other property from C, A can claim that cash or property (tfe 'exchange producn
I
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"[T]he right [to trace] only ceases when the means of ascertainment fail, which is
the case when ... money [is] mixed and confounded in a general mass of the same
description. The difficulty which arises in such a case is a difficulty of fact and not
of law, and the dictum that money has no ear-mark must be understood in the same
way; Le. as predicated only of an undivided and undistinguished mass of current
money."69
Although Professor Birks has suggested that in the situation of physi-
cal mixture of money, "each coin continues in its original ownership", it
is, as he recognises, "impossible to know which coins belong to which con-
tributor".70 Being unable to trace out of this mixed fund, the plaintiff is
restricted by the common law to a claim for money had and received, for
the value of the money so mixed. 71 The significance of this limitation be-
comes apparent when one recalls that, while it is tempting to equate money
with bank notes and/or coins, in today's society the greatest store of money
(or purchasing power) is represented by intangible property - the chose
in action - representing bank accounts in which we "deposit" our money. 72
A characteristic of a bank account is that "money" is continually being
deposited - or mixed. While this limitation does not prevent money had
and received being brought against the owner of that bank account, it
effectively prevents proceedings against subsequent recipients (including
the Official Assignee). 73 This restriction should be contrasted with the
approach of equity and its development of the charge.
b) Deposit into a bank account
Given the common law's reluctance to trace money once mixed, it is
not surprising that it would not trace into a bank account in which other
money had been deposited. What is surprising is that until the middle of
this century, it was uncertain whether the common law could trace into
a bank account in which only the rightful owner's money had been de-
posited. The problem encountered by the common law appears to have
been the effective transfer of ownership to the bank inherent in the process
of depositing the money - the money effectively being sold by the depo-
sitor to the bank in return for the bank's promise to pay him or her an
equivalent amount of money. The bank's promise to repay, however, can
69 Supra n65 at 575; 726.
70 Peter Birks, "Mixing and Tracing" (1992) 45 CLP 69 at 79.
71 A similar result follows if the plaintifrs money is mixed with that of another's in the
purchase of an asset.
72 Re Dip/ock, supra n67 at 521-2.
73 Jackson v Anderson (1811) 4 Taunt 23; 128 ER 235, however, suggests that if a plain-
tifrs money is mixed in a bank account and another person receives all the "money"
in that account, the plaintiff can trace his or her "money".to that recipient. The plain-
tifrs agent had consigned to his principal 1969 Spanish Dollars (which belonged to the
plaintiff). It appears that these coins had been mixed with a quantity of other Spanish
Dollars belonging to the defendant who innocently exchanged all the coins for English
pounds. Mansfield CJ held that the intermixture had no effect on the defendant's lia-
bility in trover -.having disposed of all the dollars, the defendant had disposed of those
belonging to the plaintiff.
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be regarded as a substitute asset purchased by the mo ey and in Re
Diplock74 the English Court of Appeal confirmed the vie s of Atkin LJ
in Banque Beige v Hambrouck75 that it was possible to race into and
through an unmixed bank account.
c) Electronic transfer
Another important limitation in common law tracing ha recently been
suggested. In Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson Millet J suggeste that the com-
mon law "can only follow a physical asset, such as ache ue or its pro-
ceeds, from one person to another",76 and is unable to trJce transfers of
money where that transfer has been implemented by "a tream of elec-
trons", for instance by telegraphic transfer. 77 A moment'js reflection will
reveal the significance of this limitation in modern bank'ng conditions.
Just as the chose in action against a bank reflects the g eatest store of
one's money (as opposed to total wealth), the transfer of ;honey between
parties is represented, not through the transfer of bank ~btes and coins,
but through the transfer of the chose in action (or part th¢reof); increas-
ingly an electronic process. If this suggestion of Millet j is adopted, it
may effectively destroy the ability to trace money (in its I wide sense) at
common law. I
2 An evaluation of the limitations to common law trac1ng
a) Why did the common law recognise the ability to tr,ce?
An examination of the reasons why the common law rec9gnised the right
to trace is an unusual starting point for an evaluation of fhe limitations.
It is important to do so, however, so as to challenge thel argument that
tracing at common law is contrary to common law ide~; an argument
which may influence how we view the limitations. Is tracing contrary to
common law ideas? In discussing one of the classic com on law tracing
cases - Taylor v Plumer, 78 Professor Lawson, for instan e, suggests that
it is, observing:
"[Taylor v Plumer] is clearly a pretty odd piece of law .... [I] is obviously a fic-
tion to say that what my agent has in breach of faith bought with my money is mine.
According to all ordinary common law ideas it should be his and I should only have
a personal action against him, that is to say, I should only be 4ble to prove in his
bankruptcy for its value. Nowhere else does the common law tre~t a fund as a single
entity, which can be recovered as such."79
What was happening in the common law tracing cases I such as Taylor
v Plumer? I suggest that either the 19th century common l~w judges must
have perceived a pressing need to depart from orthodox co~mon law prin-
74 Supra n67 at 519.
75 Supra n57 at 335.
76 [1992] 4 All ER 385 at 398 per Millet J (Ch).
77 Ibid at 400-401; a view which His Honour repeated in EI Ajou v DOflar Land Holdings
pic [1993] 3 All ER 717 at 733-734.
78 Supra n65. r
79 F H Lawson, Remedies of English Law, 2nd ed (1980) at 149. See Iso Sutton, "Trac-
ing" [1982] NZLJ 67 at 72.
I
256 Otago Law Review (1994) Vol 8 No 2
ciples or alternatively they may have had a different view of the common
law than we do. Professor Lawson adopts the earlier view by suggesting
that the common law was responding to the development of bankruptcy
laws, "so as to prevent the agent's misconduct from swelling the funds
at the disposal of the trustee in bankruptcy".80
The development of bankruptcy laws having universal application, and
with them the recognition of the concepts of rateable distribution amongst
unsecured creditors and absolution from remaining indebtedness, con-
stituted a "revolution" at English law; indeed, until the development of
the concept of absolution, an undischarged debt effectively "placed the
debtor in bond to his creditor". 81 This revolution has been so successful
that it is easy to forget that acceptance of these concepts, albeit grudgingly
by some, only occurred in England last century; that was only in 1838,
some 150 years ago, that arrest on mesne process was abolished. 82 One
of the first impacts of the developing bankruptcy laws was the exclusion
of certain property, for instance property which the bankrupt held on trust,
from distribution amongst his or her creditors. 83 Responding to the bank-
ruptcy regimes, the courts of Equity developed the concept of tracing so
as to protect equitable proprietary interests and it can be argued that the
common law, concerned to safeguard the principal against an agent's in-
solvency, did likewise.
But was this response at the expense of common law principles? Sup-
port for the argument that it wasn't is provided by the extended ideas of
ownership associated with the writ of Account. It will be recalled that the
principal-agent situation was one of the core situations in which that writ
had been available. Indeed, the 19th century judges, more familiar with
the ideas underlying the writ of Account and the fictions associated with
the claim for money had and received than we are, may not have regarded
the use of tracing rules as being contrary to common law ideas but saw
themselves as simply developing existing ideas so as to respond to the im-
pact of the developing bankruptcy laws.
b) The adoption of equitable tracing rules
What is particularly interesting about the common law's response to
the development of the bankruptcy rules is that it adopted the then equit-
able tracing rules. This process is apparent in Scott v Surman. 84 It will
80 Idem.
81 W R Cornish and G deN Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950 (1989) at 228.
See 226-237 and Holdsworth, A History ofEnglish Law, supra n16, volume viii, 229-245
for a general discussion of the evolution of the processes for debt recovery and the de-
velopment of bankruptcy legislation.
82 1 & 2 'Viet, c100.
83 Vandenaker v Desbrough (1689) 2 Vern 96; 23 ER 671 provides an early example of
the judicial recognition that trust property was not available for distribution among an
insolvent trustee's creditors.
84 Supra n59. See also Taylor v Plumer, supra 65 for further evidence ofthe common law's
absorption of the equitable tracing rules.
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be recalled that that case concerned the sale of imported tar by an agent.
The agent subsequently became bankrupt and his assignees received the
proceeds of two promissory notes (being part of the purchas price) and
a bounty paid by the government. In holding that the prin ipals could
recover this money, Lord Willes CJ specifically noted that r lief would
have been available in a court of equity, observing: "wheneve the equity
of the case is clearly with the plaintiff, I will always endeav ur if I can,
and if it be any ways consistent with the rules of law, to giv him relief
at law."85
Whitecomb v Jacob86 is the Chancery case which support~d the relief
granted in Scott v Surman. What is interesting about Whitecqmb v Jacob
is the fact that it expressed the then prevailing view that money could only
be traced into another chattel; money was regarded as hav~ng no "ear-
mark" and, as such, could not be identified. In Salkeld's relport of this
case it is stated: I
"If one employs a factor, and entrusts him with the disposal of metChandise, and
the factor receives the money and dies indebted in debts of a higher nature, and it
appears by evidence that this money was vested in other goods and r mains unpaid,
those goods shall be taken as part of the merchant's estate and not t e factor's; but
if the factor have the money, it shall be looked upon as the factor's e tate, and must
first answer the debts of a superior creditor, &c.; for, in regard that money has no
ear-mark, Equity cannot follow that in behalf of him that employe the factor. "87
This inability to identify money was also adopted by Wille CJ in Scott
v Surman, who in delivering the judgment of the Court 0 served:
"We are all agreed that if the money for which the tar had been so~d had been all
paid to the bankrupt before his bankruptcy, and had not been laid o,t again by him
in any specific thing to distinguish it from the rest of his estate, in tha~case the plain-
tiffs could not have recovered any thing in this action, but must h ve come in as
creditors . . .. "88
In the case of Taylor v Plumer, 89 which was decided some~ years later,
it is apparent that the common law is continuing to obtain guidance from
the Court of Chancery as to the operation of tracing rules. s Jessel MR
noted in Re Hallett's Estate, Knatchbull v Hallett, 90 by the tirbe of Taylor
v Plumer, Equity was willing to recognise that money could bel ear-marked.
In Taylor v Plumer, Lord Ellenborough, following the lead pf the Court
of Chancery, also recognised that money could be followe~ at common
law; the ability to identify money only ceasing when it hasl been mixed
with other money. As Lord Ellenborough observed: I
85 Scott v Surman, supra n59 at 402; 1236.
86 Supra n59.
87 Idem.
88 Supra n59 at 403-405; 1237-8.
89 Supra n65.
90 (1880) 23 ChD 696 (CA) at 717.
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"[T]he right [to trace] only ceases when the means of ascertainment fail, which is
the case when ... money [is] mixed and confounded in a general mass of the same
description. The difficulty which arises in such a case is a difficulty of fact and not
of law, and the dictum that money has no ear-mark must be understood in the same
way; Le. as predicated only of an undivided and undistinguished mass of current
money."91
Since then, the common law's approach to tracing, unlike that of equity
which developed a "modern doctrine" of tracing92 pursuant to which mixed
money can be identified through the use of a charge, has remained un-
changed. So why has the common law continued with a conservative
approach in its application of tracing rules? The apparent rationale for
the inability to trace into mixed funds, that money is a fungible (it has
no "ear-mark") and therefore, once mixed with other money it cannot be
identified, is puzzling. The common law has experienced no inability to
develop more sophisticated rules to deal with the situation of the mixture
of other fungibles, for instance corn or oil. Similarly, the common law
has- experienced no difficulty in creating presumptions as to the order in
which money deposited into a bank account is withdrawn, so as to deter-
mine the liability of partners in a banking firm. 93 Why should the com-
mon law experience a difficulty in tracing money out of a mixed bank
account, so as to impose liability upon subsequent recipients?
c) A fear of too much liability?
It is submitted that the principal reason for this conservatism was in
fact a fear of imposing strict liability upon subsequent recipients of the
money, for the value of the money so received. As was noted earlier, the
claim for money had and received, with its focus upon the receipt and
not the continued retention of the money, potentially is a formidable
remedy. To fulfil its function as a means of exchange, money must be
able to circulate freely; if recipients fear not only that they may not acquire
ownership, but that they may also face liability for their receipt of money,
money would cease to function as a means of exchange. Indeed, the need
to remove this fear was a significant factor in making currency an excep-
tion to the nemo dat rule. 94
Similar fears apply to voluntary95 innocent recipients of money. The
response of Equity in the context of innocent voluntary recipients of trust
money suggests that the imposition of liability so as to recover the value
of the money remaining may be appropriate in this situation. The im-
position of liability for the value of the money so received, however, can
be seen as being both too drastic and, if say the rule in Clayton's Case96
is used to determine when the plaintiff's money is withdrawn, the imposi-
91 Supra n65 at 575; 726.
92 Re Halletrs Estate, Knatchbull v Hallett, supra n90 at 708 per Jessel MR.
93 Devaynes v Noble; Clayton~" Case (1816) 1 Mer 529; 35 ER 767.
94 See Miller v Race, supra n50 at 457; 401 per Lord Mansfield.
95 In the sense that they had not given any consideration for the money.
96 Devaynes v Noble; Clayton's Case, supra n93.
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tion of liability may be regarded as being arbitrary. In essence, th con-
servatism of the common law to tracing money can be seen as a eans
to protect the voluntary recipient in a period in which there was no hange
of position defence. 97
Support for the submission, that underlying the common law's onser-
vatism, is a fear of imposing absolute liability on innocent recipi
contained within the judgment of Millet J in Agip (Africa) Ltd Jack-
son. 98 In attempting to limit the significance of the decision of th Court
of Appeal in Banque Beige Pour L 'Etranger v Hambrouck99 his onour
suggested:
"[That case] is no authority for the proposition that [money had and rec ived] lies
against a subsequent transferee who has parted with the money, and I d ubt that
it does. At this remove the action begins to take on the aspect of a proprie ary claim
rather than the enforcement of a personal right to account. Should it be sought to
impose personal liability on a person who has parted with the money, re ourse can
be made to. equity, which has developed appropriate principles by whic such lia-
bility can be determined. The alternative is to expose an innocent transfer e who has
dissipated the money to a claim at law where none would exist in equity a d to make
that liability depend on the fortuitous circumstances that the money ha not been
mixed with other money prior to its receipt by him. "1
It was suggested earlier that the common law judges had so6rced its
tracing rules from the Court of Chancery. If so, the subseque t expan-
sion of equity may provide a further explanation for why the jud es.didn't
develop further the common law's approach to tracing; in essence, the
judges may have perceived no need to do so. It is easy to forge that the
fiduciary relationship, long regarded as a prerequisite to the ayailability
of equitable "proprietary" remedies, 2 originally constituted an xpansion
97 The concern for innocent recipients is also apparent in Lord Goff's observ tions in Lip-
kin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, supra n42 at 28 on tracing to the effect th t "it cannot
be relied upon so as to render an innocent recipient a wrongdoer". A lim tation which
explains why Lord Goff at 25 did not regard the claim for conversion against the gambling
club as being available.
98 Supra n76.
99 Supra n57. In that case the rogue - one Hambrquck, defrauded his empl yer of a num-
ber of cheques which he paid into his own bank account in which it appea s that in sub-
stance no other funds had been paid. From the proceeds Hambrouck aid money to
his mistress who in turn deposited them in her own bank account into w ich only these
moneys were deposited. On discovering the fraud the employer's bank s ccessfully re-
covered the funds which remained in the mistress's bank account.
1 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson, supra n76 at 400 per Millet J. Concern for 'mposing strict
common law liability upon third parties may also, as Professor Birks has su gested, under-
lie the suggestion by Millet J that the common law could not trace a telegr phic transfer.
Professor Birks suggests that this limitation "is barely intelligible except a part of a con-
certed attack on the strict common law liability". "Misdirected Funds: r stitution from
the recipient" [1989] 3 LMCLQ 296 at 340.
2 In re Diplock, supra n67 at 540, the English Court of Appeal held th~t the House of
Lords in Sinclair v Brougham, supra n40, had held that an initial fiduci ry relationship
is necessary before property can be followed in equity. But see Elders Pastoral Ltd v
Bank of New Zealand [1989] 2 NZLR 180 (CA) and Re Goldcorp Ex hange [1994] 3
WLR 199 (PC).
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of the situations in which equity would provide such relief. 3 With this ex-
pansion, however, equity could provide relief in the principal and agent
relationship, the core relationship with which the common law had been
concerned. 4
d) Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd
Against this background the recent decision of the House of Lords in
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd5 is significant. One reason for its sig-
nificance is their Lordship's recognition of the availability pf a change
of position defence at common law. The recognition of this defence is
important because, as Lord Goff observed, it enables a court to give relief
to those innocent recipients of the money, "whose position has so changed
that it would be inequitable in all the circumstances to require him to make
restitution, or alternatively tQ make restitution in full". 6
The recognition of this defence is also important for allowing the de-
velopment of the action. As Lord Goff also observed, "the recognition
of ... [this] defence ... will enable a more generous approach to be taken
to the recognition of the right to restitution ...."7 Indeed, this "more
generous approach" is apparent in their Lordships' willingness to recog-
nise a more expansive approach to tracing at common law than the ortho-
dox legal approach would suggest is possible.
It will be recalled that in that case, a dishonest partner had withdrawn
cash from Lipkin Gorman's client account for the purpose of continuing
his gambling. Applying two earlier decisions of the Privy Council,8 Lord
Goff held that the dishonest partner became the legal owner of the cash
on its withdrawal from the bank. Irrespective of this finding, however,
Lipkin Gorman was successful in its claim against the recipient gambling
club. The puzzling aspect of this decision is that if the cash legally be-
longed to the dishonest partner, how could it also legally "belong" to Lip-
kin Gorman so as to provide the foundation for this action? While recog-
nising that Lipkin Gorman had to establish a basis on which it was en-
titled to this money, Lord Goff was of the opinion that to do so, it did
not have to show that the money was its legal property; it was only "a
general rule" that the necessary basis could be so established. 9 The neces-
3 See Birks, supra n5 at 381.
4 A moment's reflection reveals the success of Equity's expansion; the principal and agent
relationship has now become the paragon example of a fiduciary relationship. As Messrs
Khurshid and Matthews have observed, "[t]he problem [with dishonest agents] [i]s fairly
and squarely within equity's general jurisdiction over fiduciaries". Khurshid and Mat-
thews, "Tracing Confusion", supra n2 at 81.
5 Supra n42.
6 Ibid at 34 per Lord Goff. As Lord Goff also observed at that page, this defence is "not
open to one who has changed his position in bad faith" and "should not be open to a
wrongdoer".
7 Ibid at 35.
8 Union Bank of Australia Ltd v McClintock [1922] 1 AC 240 and Commercial Bank
of Sydney Ltd v Mann [1961] AC 1.
9 Supra n42 at 27.
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sary proprietary base in this case was held to be the original tose in action
between the solicitors and their bank.10 In essence, Lipkin orman .could
trace their interest in the chose in action into some sort of .nterest in the
money which legally belonged to the dishonest partner and WriCh he "gave"
to the defendant club.I1
e) The future for common law tracing I
So what is the future for common law tracing? One op ion is for the
common law to simply adopt the "modern" equitable tra ing rules. As
we have seen, the courts of common law have previously a opted equita-
ble tracing rules and there is also some judicial support for the continua-
tion of such an approach.I2 Adoption of these rules wou d, of course,
extinguish the limitations considered earlier. In particular, he concept of
a charge over a fund and the presumptions as to the distribu ion of money
from a mixed fund would facilitate the tracing of money i to and out of
a mixed bank account. While such an approach does ha e attractions,
it is submitted that Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd13 is inconsistent with
it. In that case, their Lordships clearly saw themselves as ealing with a
legal remedy with its own approach to tracing, albeit an a proach which
is wider than had been considered.
There are also policy arguments against the adoption of the "modern"
equitable rules and presumptions. When considering thise rules and
presumptions, it must be remembered that they were develo ed principally
in the context of disputes between the beneficiaries and the g neral creditors
of an insolvent dishonest trustee; a context in which Equity's sympathy
clearly lies with the beneficiary. Confronted with the problem of receipt
of (trust) money by an innocent voluntary recipient, Equity as responded,
not only by adopting the general approach that a plaintiff can only recover
to the extent that he or she can identify their money as re aining in the
possession of that recipient,14 but by applying the rules and presumptions
10 Ibid at 29. ~
11 A recent case displaying a similar judicial approach in focusing up n the "reality" of
the situation is Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson, supra n49. In that case m ney misappropri-
ated through the medium of forged payment orders drawn on the pI intiffs bank were
held to be the plaintiffs money, Fox LJ observing at 462: "In practic I terms [the bank]
paid with Agip's money .... [T]he substance of the matter is that oney standing to
the credit of Agip's account was paid to a third party . . . . The re lity is a payment
by the customer ...." See also Reid v Rigby & Co [1894] 2 QB40, i which, notwith-
standing a finding that the defendant's manager had borrowed money from the plaintiff
for his own purpose in replacing money belonging to the defendants which he had ab-
stracted, this borrowed money being deposited into the defendant's ba k account, it was
held that the plaintiff could bring a claim for money had and rejeived against the
defendants.
12 Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 1274 (CA) at 1282 per Denning MR.
13 Supra n42.
14 But see In re Diplock, supra n67 in which it was held that an innocent iOluntary recipient
of money may become personally liable in Equity to refund money which that person
had received as a result of a mistaken distribution by an executor.
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in such a way so as to inhibit the plaintiff from identifying property in
that recipient's possession as "belonging" to him or her; property which
factually can be seen as being derived from that money (or into which
that money has gone).15 Although Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd does
provide evidence that the common law is also willing to develop presump-
tions in favour of innocent recipients,16 the general approach of Equity
is unavailable to it. As will be recalled, the claim for money had and
received imposes liability for the receipt, not the retention, of the money.
While a change of position defence is now available, it must be remem-
bered that this defence places the onus on the defendant to show that he
or she did in fact change their position in reliance on the receipt of the
money.
If the common law is not to adopt the "modern" tracing rules where
does this leave the limitations considered earlier? The common law has
already recognised that there should be no limitation on its ability to trace
into an unmixed bank account; that particular limitation should there-
fore be forgotten.
What about the position in respect to mixed bank accounts? For the
reasons given above, there is an argument that, for the protection of sub-
sequent innocent voluntary recipients, this limitation should remain. While
this argument may be persuasive against the adoption of the equitable trac-
ing rules and presumptions, it is submitted that it is less persuasive when
used to support the continuation of an absolute limitation on the ability
to trace into and out of a mixed bank account. An immediate difficulty
with such an absolute limitation, for instance, is the protection which it
may provide to wrongdoers. Take for example, the situation in which a
mixed bank account is used by parties to a fraud as a device to inhibit
the recovery of the money. I steal $1,000.00 of your money and deposit
it into my bank account in which there is an existing credit balance of
$1.00. I then transfer $1,000.00 from that account to an accomplice.
Should my mixing of the money destroy any prospect of recovery from
the accomplice? In such a situation, I suggest that the common law should
be able to resort to the "reality" of the admixture, so as to defeat such
cynical abuse. In this respect Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd once again
becomes interesting. In that case, the parties had come to an agreement
as to the account of the plaintiff's "money" which the defendant had
received. Assuming that the dishonest partner had probably mixed at least
some of this money with his own (if even just in his pocket or wallet) one
wonders whether in the absence of his agreement the House of Lords would
have still found for the plaintiff? I would suggest yes. Factually, Cass must
have gambled and lost the plaintiff's money to the defendant club. Lip-
kin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd is also important for confirming that the avail-
15 A classic example of this is In re Diplock, supra n67.
16 In that case Lord Goff suggested that tracing "cannot be relied upon so as to render
an innocent recipient a wrongdoer". This rule would protect the innocent recipient of
money from actions for conversion while ensuring that the change of position defence
is available. Supra n42 at 27-28.
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ability of the claim against subsequent recipients is founded o~1 the fact
that "for the third party to retain the money would result in his unjust
enrichment at the expense of the owner of the money".17
For these reasons, an absolute limitation on the ability to tra e out of
a mixed bank account appears inappropriate. Given the claim' general
rationale for restoring what would otherwise constitute an unju t enrich-
ment and the fear against the imposition of arbitrary liability u on inno-
cent third parties, in what situations should the law be able to race out
of a mixed bank account? I would suggest there are two princi al situa-
tions in which this should be available.
The first situation is when the third party is the Official Ass·gnee (or
equivalent). With the aim of placating my-creditors, I steal $1 0,000.00
from you. I deposit this money into my bank account in Whi
1
hI have
a credit balance of $100.00. Before I can pay my creditors, h wever, I
become bankrupt. Should you be defeated from receiving pr ferential
recovery simply because of this admixture? Even if I had *.ssiPated
$25,000.00 of the money, should not preferential recovery for th remain-
ing $75,000.00 be available? In contrast to the trust situation, w ich may
justify the use of presumptions aimed at identifying money WhiC~ remains
in a mixed bank account as representing trust property, in this ituation,
the focus may be on the reality of the situation - factually could any
of the plaintiffs "money" have survived in that account?18 sUf,port for
such an extension comes from the fact that the early common la tracing
cases demonstrate a policy decision in favour of preferential reatment
for the "owners" of property wrongly transformed into other ~roperty,
as against the general unsecured creditor.
The second situation would be in respect to the cynical use of he mixed
bank account so as to facilitate fraud. Again, in this situatio,' an em-
phasis on the "reality" of the situation, tempered by proof of wr ngdoing,
may be appropriate.
What about the limitation as suggested by Millett J on the bility to
trace money transferred by electronic transfers of money? As as noted
above, in suggesting this limitation, Millett J was concerned as 0 the im-
position of absolute liability upon subsequent recipients. Give the pro-
tection accorded by the change of position defence and the re trictions
on the ability to trace out of a mixed bank account suggested above, it
is respectfully suggested that this limitation should not be acce ted. It is
just a means of transfer and, as such, it is submitted that it sh uld have
no detrimental effect on the ability to trace.
17 Ibid at 27 per Lord Goff.
18 While it is tempting to use the rule in Clayton's Case, supra n91, the conc rn must be
for its arbitrariness - see Barlow Clowes International Ltd (In Liq) v Vau han [1992]
4 All ER 22 (CA) and Re Registered Securities Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 545 (C ). The use
of the "rolling charge" may be possible but the practicalities of the situatio must also
be recognised - see Barlow Clowes International Ltd (In Liq) v Vaughan.
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IV THE FUTURE
The claim for money had and received is a fascinating remedy. Its form
suggests that it is designed to facilitate the recovery of money as if it were
debt. This association with the recovery of debts is not only reinforced
by the implied contract theory but the debt takes on a contractual flavour.
Given both this association and contractual flavour, it is not surprising
that claims for preferential recovery can meet some scepticism. As has
been seen, however, money had and received is not really about the recov-
ery of consens'ually created debts. Described using modern concepts, the
claim is about the restoration of what would otherwise constitute an un-
just enrichment. As such, and in hindsight, the claim can be seen as de-
veloping over the centuries in response to changing societal and judicial
views as to what circumstances the retention of money constitutes an un-
just enrichment.
Over this period, the focus of expansion has been on imposing liability
upon the initial recipient of the money. In the 1990s, however, while the
expansion of immediate liability continues, attention is increasingly be-
ing directed at the issues raised in insolvencies. The basic concept under-
lying our insolvency laws, the pro rata distribution of unsecured assets
amongst the insolvent's general creditors, is increasingly being challenged.
Where does this leave the claim for money had and received?
In some situations, the defendant's unjust enrichment does arise because
of his or her receipt of the plaintiff's money. The thief or finder of one's
money provide classic examples in which the action is specifically respond-
ing to protect ownership rights. In such situations, the claim has the ability
to confer preferential treatment. Admittedly, this preferential treatment
is subject to the vagaries of the traditional common law approach to trac-
ing, but in the post Lipkin Gorman period there are strong arguments
for acknowledging that the common law can take, and indeed does take,
a more robust view to tracing than it has previously been attributed with.
The expansion of the ability to trace money at common law, as has been
suggested, would extend the potential of the claim for money had and
received so as to confer preferential recovery in the context of an insol-
vency. There may remain, however, one significant limitation. As has been
noted earlier, the ability of the common law to confer preferential recov-
ery is premised upon the plaintiff asserting ownership to money received
by the defendant. Once the plaintiff is deprived of his or her legal owner-
ship, for instance by the operation of the currency exception to the nemo
dat rule, the ability to bring this action against subsequent recipients ceases.
If the immediate recipient can acquire title pursuant to the process by which
he or she acquires the money from the plaintiff, then the action is auto-
matically unavailable against subsequent recipients (including the Official
Assignee) with the result that the ability to confer preferential recovery
is nullified.
The example given at the commencement of the article - the theft of
money - provides a strong example in which the common law recognises
that ownership does not pass to the thief. What about other situations,
for instance, the much more common situation in which the plaintiff has
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paid the money to the defendant? Is preferential recovery a ailable in such
situations? The orthodox answer must be that the comm n law appears
reluctant to find that ownership remains with the plainti "f. As Mr Bur-
rows has observed, the common law has developed "tec nical" rules to
determine the transfer of title to money; rules which h observes "are
difficult to relate to intuitive morality" .19 The result is that it appears that
only in "a limited number of [such] cases does the properly in the money
not pass to the payee".20 An example given by Mr Burrows of a situation
in which title does not pass is that of a fundamental mi take. He com-
pares this with a causative mistake in which he suggests title does pass.
Should the nature of the mistake be so significant? A ting under the
influence of a non-fundamental mistake, but nevertheless ne sufficiently
causative so as to justify restitutionary relief against !he immediate
recipient, you pay me $100.00. The money is still in the en elope in which
you gave it to me when I became insolvent. Why should 't you be able
to trace this money into the possession of the Official Asslgnee and bring
a claim for money had and received against him or her
In this respect, the claim's inheritance from the writ of A count becomes
important and challenges the orthodox view of legal ri,hts to money.
Perhaps it is appropriate for the legal profession to r consider Lord
Dunedin's observations in Sinclair v Brougham, as to the c aim for money
had and received,21 His Lordship observing: j
"Now I think it is clear that all ideas of natural justice are ag inst allowing A to
keep the property of B, which has somehow got into A's possess~'n without any in-
tention on the part of B to make a gift to A. Where there is co tract the solution
is according to the contract, or you might say the position truly d es not arise. Such
are the cases of a bailment of a chattel or of a loan of money. ut there are many
cases where the position does arise and where there is no cont~ct.
The case of a chattel is easy: A shopkeeper delivers an article at the house of B
in mistake for the house of A. An action would lie against B f r restitution. Such
an action could easily be founded on the right of property .... But the moment
you come to deal with ... a fungible, and especially when you deal with money,
then the jus in re22 may disappear, and with it the appropriatene s of such common
law action. The familiar case is the paying of money by A to B nder the mistaken
impression in fact that a debt was due, when in truth there was 0 debt due. It was
to fit cases of this sort that the common law evolved the action or money had and
received.
I think one cannot help feeling that this action was truly the p tting of an equit-
able doctrine under a legal form. I am. using the word equitablelin a non-technical
sense, for I am not suggesting for a moment that the action was b rrowed from tech-
nical equity .... What concerns my view, however, is only th's, that it is a con-
19 Andrew Burrows, "Misdirected Funds - A Reply" (1990) 106 L I R 20 at 21.
20 Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (1993) at 4. 9
21 Although some of Lord Dunedin's views were regarded with suspi ion by the English
Court of Appeal in Re Diplock, supra n67 at 520, as Goulding J obse ved in Chase Man-
hattan Bank N.A. v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105 at 119, that Court's
concerns appear to have been directed at any suggestion that a "tr cing remedy could
be applied wherever the defendant could be shown to have got an njust enrichment,
a superfluity as Lord Dunedin called it".
22 A right of property valid as against the whole world.
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trivance which is introduced to meet an equitable idea, which idea is a wider idea
than that expressed by the proposition that where there is a jus in re an action will
lie, and where there is not a jus it will not. This follows from the undoubted fact
that where money is in question under modern conditions (by which I mean not put
into bags or a stocking) there will never be a jus in re, there can at most be only
a jus ad rem . ... 23
Now, that there is an obligation to restore, binding the defendant to pay in an action
for money had and received, does not, I think, admit of doubt ....
[B]oth an action founded on a jus in re, such as an action to get back a specific
chattel, and an action for money had and received are just different forms of work-
ing out the higher equity that no one has a right to keep either property or the pro-
ceeds of property which does not belong to him."24
Immediate support for the recognition of wider legal interests in money
is provided by cases such as Scott v Surman25 and Clarke v Shee and
Johnston26 (in which the defendant or the agent received the money from
a third party and the plaintiffs "ownership" of this money was derived
from his relationship with the agent - the plaintiff never "owned" the
money prior to its receipt by the defendant or agent), and Taylor v Plumer27
and Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltdl8 (in which the plaintiff's "ownership"
was derived from their ownership of the bank account from which the
money ultimately received by the defendant was sourced).
Re-embracing extended ideas of ownership does not mean that preferen-
tial recovery is automatically available. Just as the claim for money had
and received is not about the recovery of consensually created debts, it
is also not just about the recovery of one's property; the action has ex-
tended its coverage too far to be so described. Lord Dunedin, for example,
in the above extract, excluded the contractual situation from his discus-
sion of the proprietary aspect of the action. It also does not mean that
preferential recovery should be available outside the insolvency situation
or be for any more than the value of the money so received.
Irrespective of whether such extended ideas of legal ownership are re-
embraced, the claim for money had and received does have significant
potential for the recovery of money in the context of an insolvency. We
forget it at our peril.
23 As Professor Sutton describes it - "a right, as between the principal and the agent (and,
if the agent is bankrupt, his assignee) to treat the property as his own, even though he
may have no general right of property valid as against the whole world." "Tracing," supra
n78 at 71-2.
24 Supra n40 at 431-433.
25 Supra n59.
26 Supra n52.
27 Supra n65.
28 Supra n42.
